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The present study assessed the effects of private 
self-consciousness (a disposition) on the degree of 
accuracy predicted for one's behavior, accuracy of 
self-reports, and the sensitivity of accuracy prediction 
ratings to success or failure feedback. Ninety-six 
subjects were classified as being high or low in private 
self-consciousness based on the Fenigstein Private 
Self-consciousness Subscale (PSCS). Subjects were 
asked to choose three categories of nouns which were 
especially difficult for them to remember from ten 
possible categories. They then predicted the degree 
of accuracy with which their predicted categories wo.uld 
match their actual behavior on the memory test. After 
completing the memory test,- subjects were given bogus 
success or failure feedback that was ostensibly their 
own, that of a peer reference group, or a combination of 
both. Subjects then predicted their perceived degree of 
accuracy on a second memory test. The results indicated 
that higher initial accuracy prediction ratings were 
reported by high PSC subjects, but actual performance on 
the task did not differ for high and low PSC subjects. 
Contrary to prediction, both high and low PSC subjects 
responded to success and failure manipulations by 
conforming approximately the same amount. A four-way 
interaction confirmed the prediction for all subjects 
that peer reference group information would result in 
a "face-saving" pattern in the case of success feedback 
and a "better than average" pattern in the case of 
failure feedback. High PSC subjects also reported 
focusing inward during the course of the experiment and 
low PSC subjects reported focusing outward, although 
this result was only minimally supported statistically.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Literature Review
Self-awareness Theory
In 1972 Duval and Wicklund proposed, a theory of self- 
awareness that purported to explain numerous behaviors 
falling within the domains of social psychology, personality 
processes, and human performance. At the core of the theory 
is a concept they have called objective self-awareness, 
a state in which a. person takes oneself to be an object. 
Duval and Wicklund originally termed self-focus objective 
self-awareness and environmental focus subjective self- 
awareness. In recent years, however, this convention has 
been widely abandoned in favor of high versus low self- 
awareness or self-focus versus environmental focus alterna­
tives (Carver, 1979).
Duval and Wicklund1s (1972) proposed theory of self- 
awareness consisted of three central assumptions.' First, 
they suggested that the objects of conscious attention 
could be dichotomized: Attention can be directed outward
to the environment or attention can be directed inward 
to the self at any given instant (self-awareness). The 
possibility of a state of attention divided between self 
and environment was ruled out of the theoretical framework.
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Yet Duval and Wicklund allowed that attention could oscil­
late, however rapidly, between the self and nonself, and 
this allows one to speak in terms of increased or decreased 
self-awareness.
An increase simply means an increment in the proportion 
of time spent in self-focus. The theory views the direction 
of conscious attention being determined by the complex 
of stimuli that impinge upon us, and such stimuli may 
be divided ito two classes: Those that remind a person
of one's object status (e.g., a camera or a mirror) and 
those serving to pull attention away from the self (e.g., 
a perceptual-motor task such as a pursuit rotor) (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972).
The theory of self-awareness is, foremost, a principle 
of self-evaluation: The initial reaction to the onset
of objective self-awareness is postulated to be self- 
evaluation. When attention is focused inward, the self 
becomes an object of evaluation. Since the self is largely 
a social construct (Mead, 1934), self-focused attention 
is similar to social evaluation, one of the most important 
processes in interpersonal relations. Duval and Wicklund's 
(1972) assumption, therefore, was that self-focus leads 
to a self-critical evaluation process such that self- 
attentive people compare themselves with some standard 
on whatever therefore, was that self-focus leads to a self- 
critical evaluation process such that self-attentive people
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compare themselves with some standard on whatever behavioral 
dimension happens to be salient (see also Wicklund, 1975). 
Although it was noted by Duval and Wicklund that many poten­
tial standards of comparison exist at any given moment, 
even with respect to a single behavioral dimension, they 
reasoned that (a) one standard is more salient than others 
and (b) a person adopts that standard as a comparison value, 
at least temporarily.
Under the third assumption of self-awareness theory, 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) further argued that self-directed 
attention is, therefore, usually aversive because in most 
cases a person's actual behavior or state is worse than 
the standard of comparison. This aversiveness presumably 
leads an individual to attempt to escape the self-awareness 
state (Wicklund, 1975). If it is not possible to avoid 
self-awareness inducing stimuli (and, thus, the aversive 
state), a self-focused human may attempt to alter personal 
behavior so that it conforms more closely to the standard 
as a way of reducing aversiveness of self-awareness. The 
aversiveness of self-attention is seen as a motivator for 
behavioral alteration. Thus self-awareness theory, as 
proposed by Duval and Wicklund, is one of a larger class 
of drive theories in which the aversiveness of self-attention 
is seen as a driving force behind behavioral changes.
The original version of the Duval and Wicklund (1972) 
theory assumed that self-focused attention was invariably
aversive. Even though the existence of positive discrep­
ancies was recognized (as in the case in which a person's 
attainments exceed the aspirations), Duval and Wicklund 
reasoned that positive discrepancies are likely to dwindle 
with time. This is because aspirations rise and eventually 
surpass an individual's recent success, thereby recreating 
negative discrepancies. Duval and Wicklund therefore assumed 
discrepancies between aspirations and attainment to be 
negative in general— across virtually all people and all 
traits--with the consequence that self-focused attention 
was postulated to be an aversive condition.
Following the initial reaction to self-awareness of 
self-evaluation (that of negative effect), Duval and Wicklund
(1972) assumed two additional possible reactions would 
occur: avoidance of self-focusing stimuli or discrepancy
readuction would result. Although the order of occurrence 
of these two possible reactions was not stipulated clearly 
in the original Duval and Wicklund theory, a reexamination 
(Wicklund, 1975) revealed there was good reason for assuming 
that these two reactions fell into an order of preference. 
This was because negative affect was postulated as a motivat­
ing force, and whatever eliminated such affect quickly 
should be preferred.
A successful averting of self-focused attention would 
eliminate the negative affect, however temporarily, thus 
an individual's immediate reaction to self-awareness should
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be an avoidance of self-focusing stimuli and/or efforts 
to find distractions. If elimination of self-awareness 
is impossible, an alternative affect-reducing response 
will involve discrepancy reduction which typically entails 
efforts to bring a trait or behavior into line with a stand­
ard or aspiration. Discrepancy reduction involves eliminating 
internal discrepancies, meaning any variety of within-self 
contradiction or shortcoming (Wicklund, 1975).
To summarize, there are several possible reactions 
to self-focused attention in addition to the initial reaction 
of self-evaluation. If the salient discrepancy is negative, 
there will be an active avoidance of such stimuli, including 
efforts to create distractions (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). 
Furthermore, and only in the case of negative discrepancies, 
an inescapable self-awareness will result in attempted 
discrepancy reduction.
Self-awareness Research
The study of self-awareness seems largely to have 
been concerned with what James (1890) called the spiritual 
self, but which more modern theorists refer to as our cogni­
tive faculties, emotional states, inner beings, and behavioral 
tendencies. Most of the studies stimulated by Duval and 
Wicklund's (1972) self-awareness theory depend on the idea 
that self-awareness manipulations such as mirrors, etc., 
cause subjects to attend to and think about themselves.
The theory implies that a number of motivational effects
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can follow when self-focused attention is induced--no matter 
how the state is brought about. In past research, stimuli 
such as mirrors, video cameras, and tape recordings of 
a subject's voice have been implemented to generate self- 
focused states (Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Ickes, Wicklund,
& Ferris, 1973; Wicklund & Duval, 1971; Wicklund & Ickes,
1972 ) .
Recent research stimulated by the self-awareness theory 
(Duval & Wicklund, 1972) has shown that self-focused attent­
ion influences a wide range of attitudes, attributions, 
and behaviors. Among the results of heightened self-awareness 
is a demonstration by Carver and Scheier (1978) that self­
attention can lead simply to greater cognizance of the 
self. In an attempt to validate self-awareness manipulations, 
Carver and Scheier had subjects complete a self-focus sen­
tence completion blank (Exner, 1973) developed and validated 
earlier as a measure of egocentrism. This instrument was 
completed in an empty room or in the presence of a self- 
awareness inducing stimulus (mirror). As was expected, 
proportionally more self-focus sentence completions were 
emitted in conditions of heightened self-awareness than 
under control conditions.
Duval and Wicklund (1973) demonstrated that more self- 
attentive subjects make greater self-attributions for hypo­
thetically experienced outcomes than do less self-attentive 
subjects. As discussed, it was necessary for Duval and 
Wicklund to recognize the concept of a positive discrepancy
and the consequent self-aggrandizement which has been demon­
strated to accompany self-focused attention (Ickes et al., 
1973). When one's behavior, or real self, exceeds one's 
aspiration, the resulting positive discrepancy plus focused 
attention produces a positive affect. Accompanying a posit­
ive affect is a heightened realization of that discrepancy 
and, in terms of operational definitions, this means an 
inflated self-rating under self-awareness.
Included in the Duval and Wicklund (1973) study of 
attribution were two conditions (mirror and no mirror) 
involving hypothetical situations. For example, subjects 
were told to imagine a circumstance in which there was 
some ambiguity regarding who was responsible for an A on 
a term paper. The subjects were asked to assign a percentage 
responsibility to themselves and another person (a friend 
in the example). The results showed subjects taking more 
credit (60%) in the mirror condition than in the no mirror 
condition (49%).
If the receipt of an A on a term paper constitutes 
a positive discrepancy for subjects, it becomes easy to 
interpret these results as a magnification of the discrepancy. 
When a person feels some degree of positive affect by virtue 
of a successful experience, that affect apparently can 
be magnified by focusing attention onto the relevant dimension. 
This outcome has since been replicated (Buss & Scheier,
1976) although other research suggests some limitations 
on the effect (Hull & Levy, 1979).
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The reasoning that salient self-aspects may be more 
fully represented in consciousness when self-focus is high 
than when it is low has been extended to the internal ex­
perience of emotional states (Scheier & Carver, 1977).
In that research it was proposed that when one's attention 
is self-focused in a context in which there is affect, 
one may attend to that affect as being the salient component 
of self. In Scheier and Carver's study, subjects who had 
experienced positive and negative mood inductions subse­
quently reported feeling more elation and depression, 
respectively, when more self-attention than when less so. 
Subjects also reported experiencing greater attraction 
and repulsion toward pleasant and unpleasant slides, 
respectively, when self-attentive than when not. Others 
(Borkovec & O'Brien, 1977) found that directing a subject's 
attention to the bodily responses leads to an increase 
in the self-reported intensity of the emotion being experienced. 
These self-aspects under examination may also be a major 
determinant of the aspet of the environment that is salient 
when direction is directed outward.
Self-focus has also been demonstrated to lead to height- 
ed awareness of the absence of anticipated internal activity 
(Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Homuth, 1979). In this study, 
some subjects were led to expect arousal symptoms from 
a pill and others were not. In all cases, the pill was 
a placebo. Among subjects who expected arousal, fewer 
symptoms subsequently were reported by self-focused subjects
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than by those with less self-focus. The Gibbons et al. 
finding appears to indicate that when led to expect a diff­
erent internal state than is present, a self-attentive 
person has greater access to a veridical internal' state 
than does a less self-attentive person.
An additional study (Scheier, Carver, & Gibbons, 1979) 
investigated further this heightened awareness of internal 
experience among self-attentive persons by assessing if 
it can serve to reduce other kinds of suggestibility pheno­
mena. In the first of these studies, subjects were exposed 
to stimuli of moderate sexual attractiveness, which they 
were instructed to evaluate on the basis of their own bodily 
reactions. Subjects were led to anticipate highly arousing 
or very nonarousing stimuli. Subjects with experimentally 
heightened self-attention were less misled by these cues 
than were subjects in whom self-focus had not been increased.
The second study extended the reasoning to the experience 
of taste. Subjects were led to expect an increase or decrease 
in a flavor intensity (relative to a previous sample).
Subjects then received a slightly stronger or weaker solution. 
The intensity judgments subsequently made by highly self- 
attentive subjects were less in line with manipulated anti­
cipations and more in line with actual flavor intensities 
than were judgments made by less self-attentive subjects. 
Self-focus again minimized suggestibility, apparently by 
increasing awareness of an internal experience.
The research presented above regarding awareness of
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effect was limited to reports of subjective emotional 
experiences. Yet other research has shown that heightened 
awareness of an effect may lead to increased behavioral 
responsitivity to the effect. Scheier (1976) found that 
provoked aggression was more intense among more self-focused 
than among less self-focused subjects. Other research 
(Scheier, Carver, Schulz, Glass, & Katz, 1978) has demon­
strated that feelings of sympathy were expressed to a greater 
degree among more self-attentive than among less self- 
attentive persons. Finally, the study by Scheier et al. 
(1979) provided evidence that strong fear leads to greater 
avoidance among more self-attentive than among less self- 
attentive persons.
In a simple test of the idea that self-focused attention 
will facilitate performance on an experimental task, Wicklund 
and Duval (1971, Experiment III) asked subjects to copy 
as much German prose as.they could during two consecutive 
5-minute intervals. One group of subjects was confronted 
with a mirror during the second interval and, in examining 
the amount of increased copying from the first to second 
interval, self-aware subjects were significantly more produc­
tive. A similar effect with Swedish words was obtained 
by Liebling and Shaver (197 3) although they demonstrated 
that increases in self-awareness beyond a point can result 
in diminished performance level.
Two areas of self-awareness research are of special 
relevance to this paper. The increased accuracy of self­
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report that occurs under high self-focus has been shown 
not to be limited to reports of internal perceptual 
experiences. Studies by Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, 
and Hood (1977) and Wicklund and Duval (1971) indicated 
that self-focus enhances people's accuracy in reporting 
on their habitual behavioral tendencies and aids in resolving 
discrepancies between attitude-behavior inconsistencies.
The second relevant area of research concerns the 
distinction made by Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) 
between the state of self-awareness and the trait of self- 
consciousness. These two topics are discussed more fully, 
respectively, in the two sections that follow.
Self-report Validity
Numerous studies relating to the accuracy of self- 
reports stimulated by the Duval and Wicklund (1972) theory 
(Wicklund & Duval, 1971; Duval & Wicklund, 1973; Fazio 
& Zanna, 1976; Regan & Fazio, 1977). The inconsistency 
between self-reports and behavior is one of the long-standing 
problems in social psychology and personality research 
(Liska, 1975). A classic example of inaccurate reporting 
of past behavior is found in La Piere's (1934) study of 
the relationship between verbal and behavioral indices 
of prejudice among hotel managers. On the behavioral side,
La Piere found that only one of 251 hotel-restaurant 
establishments refused to serve a Chinese couple; but, 
in contrast, on a subsequently mailed questionnaire, only
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a small percentage replied that they would not refuse to 
serve Chinese. This example demonstrates the possible 
invalidity of self-report measures— at least self-report 
measures directed toward prior behavior.
The problem, however, seems equally acute in the attempt 
to gain predictive validity. For example, in an extensive 
series of studies on childhood morality, Hartshorne and 
May (1930) found no significant correlation between stated 
belief in the wrongness of cheating and actual resistance 
to an opportunity to cheat. Reviews by Mischel (1969) 
and Wicker (1969a) indicated that self-report forms are 
generally of slight validity only, and Wicker (1969a, b) 
emphasized the necessity of uncovering variables that would 
mediate the connection between self-reports and behavior.
Self-awareness has been suggested as a possible mediat­
ing variable that motivates a person to resolve cognitive 
inconsistencies, including attitude-behavior inconsistencies. 
To reiterate the self-awareness theory to the degree that 
a person's attention is focused upon a salient within-self 
discrepancy, and provided that attention cannot be directed 
elsewhere, there will be efforts to reduce that discrepancy. 
For example, disparities between one's actions and statements 
about those actions should be brought into alignment given 
that an individual is self-focused. This hypothesis was 
tested in a study by Carver (1975) in which subjects who 
were made self-aware brought their aggressive behavior 
increasingly into line with their values about aggression.
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Another example is the self-awareness cognitive-dissonance 
analysis (Insko, Worchel, Songer, & Arnold, 1973; Wicklund 
& Duval, 1971, Experiment III) in which attitudes were 
brought into alignment with prior decisions.
Pryor et al. (1977) tested a hypothesis that the validity 
of a simple and face-valid scale would be enhanced due 
to subjects' self-focused attention. In the experiment 
there was a potential for disparities between actual behavior 
and self-report. Pryor et al. hypothesized that self-focused 
subjects would be motivated to bring these potentially 
disparate elements into alignment and, given that the behavior­
al element was relatively fixed, this consistency could 
be brought about most easily by altering the self-report.
In an initial session, all subjects took a test of sociability 
written by Pryor et al. The scale consisted of 16 items 
such as "I have difficulty in making new friends."
During the administration of the scale, approximately 
half the subjects were simultaneously forced to view them­
selves in a large mirror. The purpose of this manipulation 
was to force subjects' attention onto themselves while 
they answered the form. After several days had lapsed, 
the subjects returned ostensibly to take part in another 
experiment. At that time, each was asked to wait in a 
cubicle with an experimental confederate.
During the ensuing 3-minute interval, the confederate 
spoke only minimally when spoken to-, and at the end of 
the interval the confederate rated the extent of the subject's
overt sociability on a 6-point scale. An additional measure 
of sociability was the total number of words emitted by 
the subject, recorded with a hidden tape recorder. These 
two indices of sociable behavior were combined and an index 
was correlated with the initial scale score. In the control 
condition, where self-focus was not prompted, the correlation 
between test score and combined behavioral index was .16 
while the analogous figure was .62 in the mirror condition. 
The correlations were reliably different (£ = .05), support­
ing the experimenters' contention that test validity can 
be bolstered by a simple self-focusing device.
In a subsequent experiment, Pryor et al. (1977) provided 
evidence that self-awareness would increase the motivation 
to avoid inconsistent self-reporting— in this case, in 
the context of a subject's self-reporting of an earlier 
decision. Self-focused attention should lead subjects 
to express attitudes toward specific objects in a manner 
consistent with their earlier behavior toward the same 
objects. Subjects first were given an opportunity to behave 
preferentially toward a variety of paper-and-pencil problem 
types. They then were led into separate cubicles in which 
a mirror was or was not present. They were asked to indicate 
their attitudes toward each problem type by rating the 
problems from extremely boring to extremely interesting.
It was expected that the relationship between behavior 
and interest ratings would be stronger in the mirror than 
in the no mirror condition.
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For each subject, rank-order correlations between 
the order of the problems worked, the proportion of problems 
worked, and the interest ratings were computed. The within- 
subject average of these two correlations was taken as 
the most general measure of each subject's behavior-attitude 
consistency. As expected, there was a substantial mirror- 
control difference (M = .69 and .13, respectively). Addition­
al analyses revealed that the two groups did not differ 
in any ways that might have led to artifactual results.
Wicklund and Duval (1971, Experiment III) also provided 
evidence that demonstrated the effectiveness of self-induced 
attention as a moderator in the resolution of attitude-
t
behavior inconsistencies. Subjects were requested to write 
five counter-attitudinal essays, each one in strong opposition 
to subjects' beliefs on five college-relevant issues.
During this session, half the subjects were confronted 
with a television camera which was described as operating 
for the purpose of testing new equipment. Opinion measures 
on the five topics were taken before and after the essay 
writing. The results showed discrepancy reduction to occur 
only when the camera was presents Subjects in that condition 
showed shifts of attitude in the direction of the essays 
for all five issues while virtually no attitude change 
was observed among the control subjects.
To summarize, to the degree that a previous behavior 
is reflected accurately in comments about oneself, those 
comments should be an accurate predictor of future behavior—
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assuming that a person's typical behavior does not undergo 
radical changes. This reasoning was supported in a study 
by Fazio and Zanna (1976) in which some of the behavior 
was made salient while they filled out a behavior-relevant 
self-report form. Subsequent to the self-reports, all 
subjects' behavioral intentions were assessed and the results 
indicated that the self-report predicted these intentions 
accurately to the degree that prior behavior had been made 
salient. The aforementioned research demonstrates that 
induced self-focused attention will enhance predictive 
validity, be it intention to behave or actual behavior 
that is assessed.
Previous research has manipulated self-awareness as 
a situational variable, but there is experimental confirmation 
(Fenigstein et al., 1975) that there may also be a person­
ality disposition to focus inward. The next section explores 
the conceptual differences between self-awareness as a 
state and self-consciousness as a trait, and the implications 
of these differences.
Self-consciousness: Private and Public
In the presence of others one is apt to become self- 
conscious, that is, aware of the self as a social object 
that can be observed and evaluated (Goffman, 1959). Goffman 
has argued that when one is attending to and involved in 
an ongoing interaction, that interaction can proceed smoothly 
and naturally; but, if one is engaged in self-focused thought
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during that interaction, concern is shifted away from what 
is being said toward whether what one says will be received 
favorably or unfavorably.
Argyle (1969) also proposed that self-consciousness, 
conceived of as the activation of the self system, produces 
a decreased concern with evaluating the behavior of others 
and an increased concern with the personal and public assess­
ment of one's own behavior. It follows that when the self 
system remains dormant, relatively less thought is given 
to one's own behavior or its effects on others. Similarly, 
Duval and Wicklund (1972) have experimentally demonstrated 
that a state of self-focused attention causes one to engage 
in self-examination and self-evaluation.
The unifying thread in the aforementioned laboratory 
studies is the process of self-focused attentions when 
a person is focusing on thoughts, feelings, behavior, or 
appearance, when reflecting, fantasizing, or daydreaming 
about oneself, or when making decisions or plans that involve 
oneself. Yet none of these approaches considered individual 
differences. Some people constantly think about themselves, 
scrutinize their behaviors, and mull over their thoughts-- 
to the point of obsessiveness. At the other extreme are 
persons whose absence of self-consciousness is so complete 
that they have no understanding of their own motives or 
of how they appear to others (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
The consistent tendency of persons to direct attention 
inward or outward is the trait of self-consciousness.
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Self-awareness refers to a state, the existence of 
self-directed attention as a result of transient situational 
variables, chronic dispositions, or both. Individual diff­
erences in the trait of self-consciousness may have implica­
tions for phenomena, such as meditation, which may be more 
easily accomplished by high self-conscious persons who have 
had previous experience in turning inward. Persons high 
in self-consciousness may readily fit into insight therapy 
whereas others may be refractory. There also may be differeces 
between high and low self-consciousness persons in their 
susceptibility to the effects of a mirror, a camera, or 
an audience (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
To assess and measure individual differences in self- 
consciousness, a 23-item scale was devised by Fenigstein 
et al (1975). The disposition to focus inward has two separate 
factors, public and private, which are weakly correlated 
(the correlations in several samples are in the 20s).
In our various social relationships, each of us is continuously 
observed and perhaps evaluated by others. Questions asked 
repeatedly if not implicitly by a person high in public 
self-consciousness are, "How do others see me?" "Do I look 
all right?" "What kind of an impression am I making?"
Fenigstein (1974) confirmed his prediction that such 
persons who chronically focus on the social aspects of 
the self should be especially sensitive to rejection.
In an experiment in which women were ignored and excluded 
by a peer group, those high in public self-consciousness
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were more upset by this rejection, less willing to affiliate, 
and less attracted to group members than those low in public 
self-consciousness. Dispositional differences in private 
self-consciousness had no effect on subjects* attraction 
toward the group.
Private self-consciousness, on the other hand, involves 
a focus on the more personal and covert aspects of oneself. 
People high in private self-consciousness are more attentive 
to their perceptions, thoughts, moods, feelings, and behavior 
tendencies. In everyday parlance they are in better touch 
with themselves. If people are in better touch with them­
selves, it follows that when insulted they should be more 
aware of anger and, therefore, be more aggressive.
Scheier (1976) tested this prediction by angering 
subjects and allowing them to aggress. Subjects high in 
private self-consciousness aggressed more intensely than 
did subjects low in private self-consciousness. Individual 
differences in public self-consciousness had no effect 
on aggression. In another study, sympathy for a handicapped 
person was induced (Scheier, Carver, Schulz, Wishnick,
Glass, & Katz, 1976). Persons high in private self- 
consciousness gave evidence of being more aware of their 
sympathies than persons low in private self-consciousness.
In both experiments the effect of public self-consciousness 
was negligible.
These various studies have established an operational 
distinction between public and private self-consciousness.
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In line with the self-consciousness theory (Buss & Scheier, 
1976; Fenigstein et al., 1975), the two dispositions affect 
behavior in different ways.
In an effort to determine how influential the effects 
of a disposition might be, Buss and Scheier (1976) devised 
an experiment in which the primary aim was to examine whether 
or not self-consciousness (a personality disposition) affects 
self-attribution. The basic procedure used was essentially 
that employed by Duval and Wicklund (1973). An experimenter 
explained that eight hypothetical situations would be des- 
scribed to a subject. The subject was asked to imagine 
being in the situations, then estimate personal responsibility 
for the outcomes from 0-100% responsibility. Four hypothetical 
situations had positive outcomes and four had negative 
outcomes. Buss and Scheier's hypothesis was that persons 
high in private self-consciousness would make more self- 
attributions than persons low in private self-consciousness.
A secondary aim of the study was to replicate the 
Duval and Wicklund (1973) findings in which persons in whom 
self-awareness had been induced by a mirror manipulation 
attributed more causality to self than did persons in no 
mirror situations. Results indicated that the mirror/no 
mirror difference failed to reach the conventional level 
of significance. The effects of the high versus low levels 
of private self-consciousness were, however, significant.
The disposition (private self-consciousness) had a stronger 
effect on self-attribution than did the mirror manipulation
(self-awareness). Subjects had also completed the Public 
Self-consciousness Subscale and an analysis of covariance 
was performed on the attribution data with public self- 
consciousness as the covariate. Results indicated no signif 
cant effects for public self-consciousness. The effect 
for private self-consciousness was still significant.
These research results bear on the interaction between 
situations and dispositions. Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss
(1973) suggested that situational manipulations eliminate 
dispositional effects. They argued that dispositions are 
important only when manipulations are weak or absent.
Strong manipulations ostensibly cancel out the impact of 
dispositions. The Buss and Scheier (1976) results are 
partial opposition to the Mischel et al. hypothesis. Given 
negative hypothetical situations, private self-consciousness 
increased self-attributions more when self-awareness was 
manipulated (mirror condition) than when it was not (control 
condition). This finding implies that the Mischel et al. 
hypothesis may be of limited generality.
Evidence has been provided by Bern and Allen (1974) 
that there is, however, a middle ground between accepting 
dispositions without question and denying their value.
Bern and Allen's position assumes that dispositions may 
be important for some persons but not for others. Bern 
and Allen established that those who report consistency 
in a given disposition show a reasonably high correlation 
between their self-reported and observed behaviors; for
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those who report inconsistency, this correlation is low.
These findings make a case for regarding dispositions as 
important— but only for part of the population.
The approach of Bern and Allen (1974) was empirical.
It identified only those who were consistent or inconsistent 
on a particular dimension. For example, subjects who were 
consistent on friendliness were not necessarily consistent 
on conscientiousness. Thus, for each disposition one would 
have to identify anew the subpopulation of consistent persons.
Scheier, Buss, and Buss (1978) also identified a sub­
population whose self-reports were generally accurate, 
but they approached the problem from a theoretical perspec­
tive. They identified this population as persons high 
in private self-consciousness. In their use of private 
self-consciousness as a moderator variable in the relationship 
between self-reports and observed behavior, Scheier et 
al. confirmed their prediction that persons high in private 
self-consciousness know themselves better.
In the Scheier, Buss, et al. (1978) study the effect 
of dispositional self-consciousness on the accuracy of 
self-reports was studied in aggression research. College 
undergraduates were administered the Self-consciousness 
Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) during the regularly scheduled 
class period. The Private Self-consciousness Subscale 
was used to select subjects. Scores on the subscale ranged 
from 4-40 with ameanof 24.2. At the same time, subjects 
also responded to the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Buss
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& Durkee, 1957) designed to measure self-reports of aggress­
ive behavior.
Several weeks later, the subjects' aggressive behavior 
was measured using an "aggression machine" (Buss, 1961,
1966). The amount of shock a subject (teacher) was willing 
to give to a confederate (victim) was measured as the average 
intensity of 25 administered shocks. Results showed a 
significant overall correlation between rated aggressiveness 
and shock intensity for all 63 subjects sampled for the 
experiment (r = .34, £ < .05). More important, however, 
was the difference in correlations obtained for high and 
low private self-conscious subjects. Self-rated aggressive­
ness correlated significantly with shock intensity among 
high private self-conscious subject (r = .66, £ < .001) 
but not among low private self-conscious subjects (r =
.09,_p>.3). The difference between these correlations 
was highly significant. The correspondence between self- 
report and behavior was enhanced by private self-consciousness. 
To determine the effect of public self-consciousness, subjects 
were redivided into two new groups based on a median split 
of the Public Self-consciousness Subscale. The correlation 
between rated aggressiveness and shock intensity was not 
very different from high public self-consciousness subjects 
(r = .38, £ < .01) than for low public self-consciousness 
subjects (r = .31, £ < .05), a statistically nonsignificant 
difference.
A study by Turner (1975) can be regarded as a conceptual
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replication. Subjects were asked to report how they would 
behave in a three-person group that was required to make 
a difficult decision. They were told to write what they 
would do if they expressed all the dominance of which they 
were capable. Several weeks later each subject engaged 
in a discussion in the laboratory with two experimental 
confederates. The subject was instructed to display as 
much dominant behavior as possible. A median split in 
private self-consciousness scores was used to divide the 
subjects into high and low groups. Correlations were 
computed between the amount of dominance displayed in the 
report and the amount of dominance displayed behaviorally 
in the laboratory discussion. For subjects high in private 
self-consciousness, this correlation was .66; for those 
low in private self-consciousness, it was .33.
Turner (1976) also extrapolated from the self- 
consciousness theory that persons high in private self- 
consciousness know themselves better and that such persons 
have more information about themselves. Turner tested this 
derivation by asking students to describe themselves. 
Consistent with Turner's hypothesis, subjects high in private 
self-consciousness generated significantly more self- 
descriptive statements than subjects low in private self- 
consciousness. Thus, when compared to persons low in private 
self-consciousness, those high in private self-consciousness 
are more accurate and more detailed in their self-reports. 
Turner's findings and the aforementioned research provide
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empirical support for the validity of the use of private 
self-consciousness as a moderator variable in the relationship 
between self-reports and observed behavior.
The next section examines several experimental investi­
gations using self-consciousness as a moderator variable.
A brief summary of studies investigating the influence 
of feedback on expectancies in included because this area 
of research is especially relevant to the purpose of the 
present study.
Self-consciousnes s, Success/Failure Feedback, 
and Outcome Expectancies
Feather (1966) and Feather and Saville (1970) were 
among the first researchers to study the effects of one's 
personal expectancies upon one's behavior. These studies 
typically involved performance on an ambiguous task followed 
by positive or negative feedback. Subjects then were asked 
to predict their future behavior on a similar task. Results 
indicated that not only did feedback affect subjects' 
predictions about future behavior, it also created a change 
in performance with subjects given positive feedback perform­
ing better than those given negative feedback. When subjects 
were given an opportunity to explain possible causes for 
behavior but did not make their expectancies about future 
behavior explicit, subsequent performance improved in the 
success and failure situations. When expectations were 
explicit, performance was found to parallel expectation
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(Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981).
Another variable that influences performance is the 
number of expectancy judgments required of a. subject and 
the position or spacing of those expectancies. Dweck and 
Gilliard (1975) have shown that if expectations are stated 
prior to each trial in a series of trials, as compared to 
expectations stated only before the last trial or the first 
and last trial, that expectation for future behavior affects 
performance differently. When trial-by-trial expectancy 
statements are required, there may be implicit social 
demands to revise expectancies downward following a negative 
outcome, or upward following a positive outcome (Feather,
1966; Feather, 1968).
Attributions one makes as to the cause of past behavior 
have also been demonstrated to affect future performance 
(Weiner, Russell, & Levman, 1978). Attribution to an internal 
locus of control may change individuals' self-concepts 
and influence their behaviors in a variety of situations 
while external attributions have been demonstrated to minimize 
the influence of feedback.
Early researchers, however, did not investigate the 
probability that an individual who enters a situation may 
already have expectancies that might influence that person's 
behavior. These early studies typically involved tasks 
that a subject was not familiar with and, thus, had no 
real expectancy as to how the subject should perform.
Feedback provided by an experimenter might more easily
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be accepted by subjects having no direct experience with 
a task. There no doubt are individual differences in how 
willing subjects are to accept information that is incon­
sistent with their self-concepts. Interest in this area 
was stimulated by the research of Markus (1977) and Hayden 
and Mischel (1976).
In the Markus (1977) study, subjects whose self-schema 
emphasized independence were less willing to accept contra­
dictory evidence about themselves on the dependence/ 
independence dimension. Subjects in the Hayden and Mischel 
(1976) study attributed inconsistencies between traits 
and behavior to situational or transient effects. Similar 
findings were reported by Bell, Wicklund, Manko, and Larkin 
(1976).
The degree to which individuals vary in the consistency 
of their behaviors and the importance of being consistent 
has been investigated by a number of researchers (Bern &
Allen, 1974; Mischel, 1968). More recently via investigation 
the dimensions of self-consciousness have been recognized 
as a possible moderator variable in the effects of expect­
ancies upon future behavior.
Carver, Blaney, and Scheier (1979) incorporated ex­
perimental manipulations of self-focus (mirror present 
or absent) in a study of an attentional model of fear-based 
behavior. Carver et al. predicted that among subjects 
with a moderate fear of snakes, heightened self-attention 
during an approach attempt would cause increased awareness
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of existing anxiety followed by one of two courses of events. 
Subjects who believed they could do the behavior in spite 
of their fear (as measured by chronic dispositional expect­
ancies) were expected to redirect their attention to the 
behavioral-goal comparison and exhibit no behavioral deficit. 
Subjects who doubted their ability to do the behavior were 
expected to divert their attention from the behavior-goal 
comparison and withdraw behaviorally from the approach 
attempt. The results of the study supported the predictions. 
Confident subjects were found to be undeterred by heightened 
self-awareness during the approach task, but doubtful subjects 
withdrew earlier in the approach sequence when self-focus 
was high than when it was low.
This result was conceptually replicated (Carver et al., 
1979) in a test of a theoretical model of behavioral self- 
regulation which makes predictions about the effects of 
failure on a person's subsequent efforts. This model holds' 
that degree of effort will be a product of two things: 
expectancy of being able to redress the failure and degree 
of self-attention. All subjects in the study were confronted 
with a failure experience on an intellectual task in order 
to create a large self- versus standard discrepancy. Subjects 
then undertook a second task ostensibly bearing on the 
same intellectual skill.
Rather than assessing subjects' chronic expectancies, 
as in the Carver et al. (1979) study, an experimental 
manipulation of outcome expectancy was introduced. Subjects
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were led to believe that they could potentially do quite 
well on the second task or that they probably would do 
quite poorly. In reality, the second task was a measure 
of persistence. As predicted, subjects in whom unfavorable 
expectancies had been induced were less persistent when 
self-focus was high than when it was low. Also, as predicted, 
subjects with favorable expectancies were more persistent 
when self-focus was high than when it was low.
Dispositional self-consciousness was implicated as 
a moderator variable in a study by Brockner (1979) examining 
the effects of self-focus on persons high or low in self­
esteem following success and failure experiences. Brockner 
measured dispositional self-consciousness using the Private 
Self-consciousness Subscale (Fenigstein et al., 1975).
Subjects high and low in self-esteem first received success 
or failure feedback on a social insight test, then completed 
a concept formulation task in the presence or absence of 
a self-focusing stimulus (mirror). It was reasoned that 
if low self-esteem subjects were provided with success 
feedback from a previous task, the nature of their self- 
consciousness would be altered on a subsequent task (Brockner, 
1979; Brockner & Hulton, 1978); specifically, low self­
esteem subjects would attend more to positive and less 
anxiety provoking aspects of themselves than would low 
self-esteem subjects who received failure feedback from 
the previous task. Under the former condition, the low 
self-esteem subjects' subsequent task performance was
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expected to improve. For high self-esteem individuals
who typically perform well, previous success/failure feedbacks
was expected to have little effect on subsequent performance.
Results indicated that high self-esteem subjects per­
formed equally well following success or failure. Subjects 
low in self-esteem in the success condition performed 
significantly better than low self-esteem subjects in the 
failure condition (and just as well as high self-esteem 
subjects success participants). This self-esteem x prior 
feedback interaction was significant in the presence of 
a mirror but not in its absence. In the absence of a mirror, 
however, this interaction was observed for subjects who 
were high in dispositional self-consciousness (private 
self-consciousness) but not for those who were low. That 
only subjects high in dispositional self-consciousness 
in the no self-focus condition performed as did those in 
the self-focus condition further attests to the importance 
of considering individual differences in the chronic tendency 
(disposition) to focus inward.
CHAPTER II
RATIONAL AND PREDICTIONS 
Rationale
Self-awareness has been construed as a process that 
regulates the direction and intensity of thoughts, feelings, 
and actions (Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Self-awareness re­
search has demonstrated that when self-awareness is induced 
by any variety of manipulations (mirrors, cameras, tape 
recorded voice of subject) a wide range of attitudes, 
attributions, and behaviors are affected. Among the results 
of heightened self-awareness are greater cognizance of 
self (Carver & Scheier, 1978), more self-attributions for 
hypothetically experienced outcomes (Duval & Wicklund,
1973), greater attention to internal experience of emotional 
states (Scheier & Carver, 1977), and greater recognition 
of the absence of anticipated internal activity (Gibbons, 
Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979).
Research especially relevant to the thesis of this 
paper focused on the accuracy of self-reports when self- 
awareness was heightened. One of the long-standing problems 
in social psychological investigation has been the inconsist­
encies between self-reports and actual behavior. Both 
predictive and postdictive validity have been poor (La 
Piere, 1934; Hartshorn & May, 1930). Self-awareness was
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suggested as a possible mediating variable that motivates 
a person to resolve cognitive inconsistencies, including 
attitude-behavior inconsistencies (Duval & Wicklund, 1971), 
Carver (1975) tested the hypothesis that disparities between 
one's actions and statements about those actions will be 
brought into alignment when an individual is self-focused. 
Results indicated that subjects who were made self-aware 
performed aggressive behaviors that were more consistent 
with their values about aggression than did subjects who 
were not self-focused. Additional evidence for this hypothe­
sis was provided by Pryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, and 
Hood (1977). In their study the validity of a simple and 
face-valid scale of sociability was enhanced due to subjects' 
self-focused attention. Additionally, Pryor et al. provided 
evidence that self-awareness would increase the motivation 
to be consistent in the self-reporting of a subject's earlier 
decision. Self-focused attention led subjects to express 
attitudes toward specific objects in a manner consistent 
with their earlier behavior toward the same objects.
Interest in the self-awareness research area led 
researchers to investigate the possibility that individual 
differences might exist in a person's disposition or chronic 
tendency to focus inward (termed private self-consciousness). 
Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) expected that the 
disposition to focus inward would influence behavior in 
the same manner as situationally induced self-awareness 
(more accurate and more consistent self-reports). They
developed a scale to measure what they termed private self- 
consciousness (PSC). Scheier (1976) found that persons 
high in PSC were more attuned to their inner thoughts, 
feelings, and motives, and, therefore, more aware of their 
anger. Results showed that angry subjects who were high 
on the PSC subscale were more aggressive. Persons high 
in PSC have also given evidence of being more aware of 
their sympathy toward a handicapped person than persons 
low in PSC (Scheier, Carver, Schulz, Glass, & Katz, 1978).
The purpose of the present study was, in part, to 
attempt a conceptual replication of certain findings of 
self-awareness research dealing with the accuracy of self- 
reports. Individual differences in the trait of self- 
consciousness were expected to influence the behavior of 
subjects high in private self-consciousness in a manner 
consistent with findings of situational self-awareness 
(more accurate self-reports).
An additional purpose of the study was an attempt 
to explore the contradictory findings of the effects of 
heightened self-awareness on suggestibility and conformity. 
Previous research has shown that heightened self-focus 
can lead a person to be less resistant to the influence 
of others and more likely to conform (Carver, 1974; Duval, 
1976; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). For example, in the Wicklund 
and Duval study, they found that subjects who listened 
to their own voices on a tape recorder conformed more with 
the modal opinion of a positive reference gioup than did
control subjects who listened to the tape-recorded voice 
of another person. However, other research (Scheier, Carver, 
& Gibbons, 1979) has shown that self-focused attention 
can heighten a person's cognizance of his or her internal 
state and thereby make that person more resistant to the 
suggestions and influences of others. Subjects in a state 
of heightened self-awareness were less misled by experimental 
manipulations, and in a related experiment, were less misled 
by experimental manipulations concerning increases and 
decreases in flavor intensities.
The specific self-aspect toward which the influence 
attempt was directed may account for the difference in 
these sets of findings. Some self-aspects, like bodily 
states, may require generally less social validation, whereas 
attempts to influence the person's opinion about other 
aspects of self (attitudes or beliefs) may require extensive 
social validation. The former situation might be under 
the control of a personal standard or value that the person 
maintains whereas the second situation might be under the 
control of the possible influence of an external, salient 
behavioral norm. A situation has been created in a study 
by Diener and Srull (1979) in which an important personal 
value was opposed by an equally salient behavioral norm. 
Subjects established an internal and an external or social 
"standard" on a task of dot-guessing. Subjects' reactions 
to the information that they had performed better than 
either the external standard or their personal standard
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were then assessed. Results indicated that self-aware 
subjects rewarded themselves more when they had exceeded 
the social standard than when they had surpassed their 
own standards. When subjects were told they had surpassed 
both standards, they rewarded themselves more highly than 
when they had surpassed either standard or neither standard. 
An examination of the self-reinforcement and satisfaction 
with performance data revealed that subjects in one condition 
or the other weighted a certain standard more heavily, 
but did not ignore the other standard. That is, all subjects 
took both standards into account, but simply shifted the 
relative weight placed on them.
However, Gibbons and Wright (1983) argued that the 
self-aware subjects in the Diener and Srull (1979) study 
may have responded more to the social norm simply because 
it was a much more powerful standard based on the supposed 
behavior of 250 people. To combat this problem, Gibbons 
and Wright employed personal and social standards that 
were considered to be very important to the subjects, as 
well as fairly comparable in terms of impact on them 
(subjects’ sexual attitudes). Subjects terms as high-guilt 
or conservative were confronted by a potent external standard 
in the form of a bogus opinion poll that indicated that 
college students' sexual attitudes generally were becoming 
more liberal. Heightened self-awareness presumably would 
heighten the salience of this conflict, pitting their desire 
to conform against their desire to be consistent with their
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attitudes. Results indicated that self-aware subjects 
took both sets of standards into account? that is, they 
did try to bring their attitudes more in line with those 
of their peers, but in so doing they chose not to abandon 
their own attitudes— they just modified them somewhat.
The subjects in this study were chosen because they indicated 
that they maintained relatively strong personal standards 
on a particular topic. The social standard that was created 
was also quite compelling. If subjects had been chosen 
who were not particularly committed to a personal attitude 
or who had conflicting standards on the topic then subjects 
would have been expected to give in to the external Conformity 
pressure when in a state of self-awareness. However, the 
use of two standards that were both salient and impactful 
prompted subjects to respond to both. To ignore either 
one of the standards would have meant creating a discrep­
ancy— between behavior and one or the other standard— -something 
people are very unlikely to do when their attention is 
self-focused.
In the present study, subjects reported on the degree 
of accuracy with which they predicted their behavior con­
cerning their memory behavior. Presumably, predicting 
one's behavior is a seif-aspect which would have a strong 
personal component yet one which also might be subject 
to influence from external standards (degree of accuracy 
reported by a bogus peer reference group). In a situation 
where the source of feedback was one's own (ostensibly)
high PSC subjects would be expected to conform more to 
the standard than subjects low in PSC. In a situation 
where the source of feedback (or standard) was the perform­
ance of one's peers, high PSC subjects were expected to 
show less conformity to the standard given than would low 
PSC subjects. High PSC subjects were expected to adhere 
more to their conceptions of their behavior and to be less 
influenced by the supposed performance of a peer reference 
group. In a situation where the subject received both 
feedback about his own performance and that of a peer 
reference group greater conformity to standard would be 
expected for both high and low PSC subjects due to the 
combined influence of both types of feedback (either both 
sources of feedback being successful or both sources of 
feedback indicating a degree of failure).
A third purpose of the present study was to test for 
the occurrence of two different predictions concerning 
the influence of success/failure feedback on expectancies 
for future performance. Feather (1966) demonstrated that 
success feedback leads to elevated expectancies for future 
performance and more successful future performance when 
the feedback was reported to be the subject's own performance 
score. The opposite pattern was shown to hold true for 
failure feedback. Weiner (1972), however, reported a 
different trend for expectancies when the feedback was 
that of a reference group. In this instance, subjects 
who were told that a reference group had performed very
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successfully on a task lowered their own subsequent expect­
ancies. This provided subjects with a face-saving excuse 
in case their behaviors failed to match those of the reference 
group. In the case of failure feedback describing the 
performance of a reference group, the tendency was for 
subjects to raise their own expectations, assuming themselves 
to be better than the average person.
The present study administered the Private Self- 
consciousness Subscale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) to subjects 
to determine their chronic degree of self-focused attention.
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects 
were asked to predict, from a list of 10 categories of 
nouns, the three categories which were thought to be most 
difficult for them to remember. Subjects rated themselves 
as to how accurately they felt their behaviors would match 
their predictions. Subjects then received a memory test 
comprised of four nouns from each of the 10 categories 
in semi-random order. Next, bogus success or failure feed­
back was given to the subjects.
In the self-feedback condition, subjects received 
a percentage rating which ostensibly reported the degree 
of accuracy to which their predicted behaviors match their 
memory test behaviors. Subjects in the reference group 
feedback condition were told that previously tested college 
students averaged a certain percentage of accuracy. Subjects 
in the combined feedback condition were given what ostensibly 
were their own accuracy results and the accuracy results
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of previously tested college students.
The subjects were told they were to take the memory 
test a second time and were asked to rate their expected 
level of accuracy for the second performance. Subjects 
predicted their memory behavior on the same three categories 
of nouns they had predicted they would have difficulty 
remembering on the first test. At this point, the study 
was concluded with no second memory test being given.
Predictions 
Initial Accuracy Prediction
Subjects classified as being high in private self- 
consciousness (PSC) were expected to have higher initial 
accuracy predictions than were subjects classified as being 
low in private self-consciousness. Accuracy predictions 
were measured on a scale from 0-100%. Subjects in the 
high PSC group were expected to have more information 
and more accurate information about themselves than subjects 
in the low PSC group. Subjects high in PSC should, therefore, 
be more confident that their reported behaviors would match 
their actual behaviors. It was hypothesized that their 
initial predictions should reflect this confidence.
Memory Test Results
Subjects in the high PSC group were expected to perform 
more in accordance with their predicted behaviors than 
were subjects in the low PSC group. The categories selected 
by subjects as difficult to remember were those in which
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they should demonstrate more forgetfulness.
Variation of Accuracy Predictions
Subjects were asked to predict the degree to which 
their self-reports would match, their actual behaviors on 
two separate occasionis. Bogus success or failure feedback 
was given to the subjects between these accuracy predictions.
It was predicted that people "in the high PSC group would 
be less suggestible, that is, they would conform less to 
the feedback standard given, whether success or failure. 
Whatever degree of conformity was exhibited would be greater 
in the own feedback condition than in the reference group 
feedback condition. Since people high in PSC spent relatively 
more time thinking about their thoughts, feelings, and 
motives, self-information should be of greater interest 
to people high in PSC. People low in PSC, who spend relatively 
less time examining their thoughts, feelings, and motives, 
were expected to be more interested in and more influenced 
by reference group feedback.
In the combined feedback conditions, both high and 
low PSC people were expected to conform to the feedback 
standards to a greater degree. The combination of their 
own feedback and a peer reference group's feedback being 
in the same percentage range (both success or both failure) 
was expected to exert a greater influence on the subjects.
The response to this influence was expected to be a greater 
matching to standard among all the subjects.
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Trends of Feedback Influence
Both high and low PSC subjects were expected to elevate 
their expectancies for future performance after being given 
success feedback and to lower their expectancies for future 
performance after being given failure feedback. In both 
cases, the feedback was ostensibly their own. When the 
feedback was that of a reference group (success feedback) 
subjects were expected to raise their expectations for 
future performance but not to the level of the performance 
of the reference group. When failure feedback from a ref­
erence group was given, subjects were expected to lower 
their expectancies for future performance somewhat but 
to remain above the level of the reference group. No pre­
diction was made concerning the behavior of the high and
low PSC subjects in the combined feedback condition.
\
Attentional Focus Measure
Previous research (Fenigstein, 1979) has indicated 
that people categorized as high on the Private Self- 
consciousness Subscale reported spending more time thinking 
about themselves during the course of Fenigstein et al.'s 
study than did subjects categorized as being low. The 
direction of attention was measured on a 9-point scale.
Subjects indicated whether they tended to pay more attention 
to their inner thoughts, feelings, etc., during the experiment 
or whether their attention, was directed outward towards 
the experimental situation. It was predicted that high
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PSC people would report spending more time focusing inward 
during the course of the study than low PSC people.
^CHAPTER III
METHOD 
Design of Study
Subjects
Subjects were 96 undergraduates from the University 
of Montana subject pool. Both sex subjects were used because 
a review by Wicklund (1975) reported that self-awareness 
seems to have the same effect on males and females. In 
general, the data show an absence of gender differences.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of six experimental 
conditions described more fully below.
Independent Variables
The study consisted o f 2 x 3 x 2 x 2  split-plot fact­
orial design with three between-subjects and two within- 
subjects dependent measures. Between-subject variables 
were high/low levels or private self-consciousness, success/ 
failure feedback, and own/reference group/combined accuracy 
results score. The two within-subject dependent measures 
were two accuracy prediction ratings, one rating given 
before the success/failure manipulation and the other rating 
given after the manipulation but before a second memory 
test.
Subjects were administered the Private Self-consciousness 
Subscale (Fenigstein, et al., 1975). Subjects indicated
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on a 5-point scale (0-4) how much each of the 10 private 
self-conscious statements was characteristic of them.
The scores for each subject were summed over the 10 items 
with higher scores representing greater self-consciousness.
Subjects then were asked to predict their behavior 
on a memory test. After they had completed the test, sub­
jects were given success or failure feedback concerning 
their accuracy predictions. Subjects in the own feedback 
condition were led to believe the feedback they received 
was the experimenter-scored results of their memory
test. Subjects in the reference group feedback conditions
{
were given feedback ostensibly obtained from a previously 
tested group of college students. Subjects in the combined 
feedback conditions were given what ostensibly was their 
own feedback and the feedback of the reference group.
Subjects in all the experimental conditions were then told 
they were to take a second memory test and requested to 
make a second accuracy prediction rating. These two accuracy 
prediction ratings constituted the within-subjects dependent 
measure.
Procedure
Subjects were run individually by a female experimenter. 
Each subject was led into the experimental room and seated 
facing a small table. To the rear of the table was a 
tape recorder player assembly. The subject was told that 
the purpose of the equipment would be explained later in
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the experiment.
The subject was asked to read a printed sheet (Appendix, 
p. 93) containing a short introduction to the study. The 
printed sheet stated that the experiment was investigating 
the accuracy with which people predict their behaviors.
In line with this purpose, the experimenter intended to 
give the subject several memory tests. The sheet continued 
by stating that the subject would be asked to fill out 
a number of self-report forms during the experiment. Subjects 
were asked not to put their names on any of the forms.
The subject was given the Private Self-consciousness 
Subscale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) (Appendix, p. 91,92).
The experimenter asked the subject to read the instructions 
carefully, complete the form, and signal the experimenter 
in an adjoining room when finished. The experimenter then 
collected the form and gave the subject a second printed 
sheet (Appendix, p. 94) which explained the instructions 
for the memory test. While the subject was reading the 
instruction form, the experimenter totaled the subject's 
score on the Private Self-consciousness Subscale. This 
score was used to assign the subject to a cell to ensure 
equal numbers of high and low PSC subjects in each cell.
The instruction sheet stated that 10 categories of 
nouns (relatives, names, states, colors, vegetables, pro­
fessions, military titles, units of time, dates, and animals) 
were listed below (Battig & Montague, 1969). Subjects 
were instructed to select three of the categories which
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were difficult for them to remember and write the names 
on three separate lines. The bottom of the page contained 
a self-report item. Subjects were asked to rate themselves 
(from 0-100%) as.to how accurately they felt their behaviors 
on the memory test would match their predictions. A 
final sentence indicated that the experimenter would be 
available if the subject had any questions.
The experimenter then checked the s u b j e c t ’s form 
to ensure that instructions had been followed. Next, she 
gave the subject an instruction sheet describing the memory 
test in detail. Instructions (Appendix, p. 95) stated that 
the tape recorder/player would be turned on by the 
experimenter. The experimenter then would leave the room 
to facilitate the s u b j e c t ’s concentration while taking 
the test.
The instructions continued by stating that the subject 
would first hear a list of 40 words (four words from each 
of the 10 categories presented in random order). The subject 
was instructed simply to listen to this first list. Upon 
completion of the 40 words, the subject would hear the 
words "Second List," at which time the subject was to listen 
to the next word and determine if it was a word from the 
first list that had been heard before. If the subject 
thought the word had been heard before, the subject was to 
place a check in the YES column on the answer she.et. If 
the subject thought that the word had not been heard 
before, the subject was to place a check in the NO column.
Half the words on the second list had been heard 
by the subject on the first list and half were different 
words in the same category. An example was given on the 
instruction sheet. After the subject had finished reading 
the instructions, the experimenter asked if the subject 
understood how the memory test would proceed. If the 
subject had any questions, the experimenter clarified the 
procedures. The experimenter asked the subject to signal 
when the test was completed. She then started the tape 
recorder/player and left the room. When the subject 
indicated the test was completed, the experimenter reentered 
the testing room. The experimenter then reacted in one 
of three ways depending upon the source of feedback 
condition to which the subject had been assigned.
Own feedback condition. In the own feedback condition 
the experimenter said, "I can total your score by hand 
and get your results on the memory test for you now 
The experimenter then compared the subject's answer sheet 
to a key. The experimenter marked an appropriate number 
of items wrong depending on the type of feedback the subject 
was to receive (success or failure). The experimenter 
then performed some phony calculations on a hand calculator, 
picked up a paper form from a stack, and wrote the. subject's 
supposed accuracy score on the blank provided under the 
title "Subject's Accuracy Score on Memory Test One" 
(Appendix, p. 96). Feedback differed depending on whether
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the subject was in the success or failure condition.
The experimenter said, " H e r e ’s your score on the memory
test," and handed the form to the subject. She then said,
"I'm going to have you take the memory test again, 
but first I'd like to have you rate your accuracy 
prediction for the second test. Remember, you're 
predicting you'll forget words in the same three 
categories as in the first test."
At the bottom of the Accuracy Score Results form was a
second accuracy prediction scale. The experimenter indicated
this rating scale to the subject, made sure the subject
understood what was expected, asked the subject to signal
when the second accuracy prediction was finished, and left
the room.
Reference group feedback. In the reference group
feedback condition, after the subject signaled that the
memory test had been completed, the experimenter entered
the testing room and said,
"I'm sorry, but I can't total your score until all 
the subjects are tested. We've been testing behavioral 
predictions for the last two quarters. There's a 
form around here somewhere indicating the results if 
you would like to see them."
The experimenter then appeared to glance around the room
until she sighted a stack of forms. She handed one to the
subject and said, "Here's one."
The form contained a paragraph indicating that people's
ability to predict their behavior on the memory test had
been partially evaluated during two previous quarters.
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This paragraph also indicated that University of 
Montana students over the two previous quarters had 
averaged 92.5% accuracy (success condition) or 25.5% 
accuracy (failure condition). The experimenter appeared 
to pay little attention while the subject read the form.
After the. experimenter was certain the subject had 
read the form, she said, "Let's get back to your second 
memory test" (emphasizing the word your). She then 
handed the subject a rating form for the subject's accuracy 
prediction for the second memory test (Appendix, p. 99).
The experimenter said, "Remember, y o u ’re predicting about 
the same three categories you predicted about on the 
first test." Before leaving the room, the experimenter 
asked the subject to signal when the second accuracy 
prediction was finished.
Combined feedback group. In the combined feedback 
group the experimenter followed the procedures in the 
own feedback condition but, instead of giving the subject 
a form and writing in the s u b j e c t ’s accuracy score, she 
picked up a form containing information about testing 
results obtained the previous quarters (Appendix, pp. 98, 
99). At the bottom of this form were the words, "Present 
subject's score," followed by a blank space. The 
experimenter filled in this blank with the subject's 
supposed accuracy rating and handed it to the subject.
In the success feedback condition the previously tested 
group's accuracy score and the subject's accuracy score 
were almost identical: 92.5% and 91.5%, respectively.
In the failure feedback condition the accuracy scores 
were low: 25.5% and 25.2%, respectively. After the
experimenter was certain the subject had read the form, 
she said, "Let's get back to your second memory test" 
(emphasizing the word your). She then handed the subject 
a rating form for the accuracy prediction for the second 
memory test (Appendix, p. 99). Instructions were repeated 
as for the other experimental groups: "Remember, you're
predicting about the same three categories you predicted 
about on the first test." Before leaving the room, the 
experimenter asked the subject to signal when the second 
accuracy prediction, was completed.
In all three source of feedback conditions, the
experimenter collected the second accuracy predictions
after the subject signaled. She then told the subject,
"I'm sorry, but we're running out of time. We 
won't be able to do the second memory test today. 
Before you go, though, would you please fill out 
a few short report items for me?"
The subject was given a form which asked the person to
indicate the nature of the individual's attentional focus
while participating in the experiment (Appendix, p. 100).
Previous research (Fenigst.ein, 1979) has indicated that
high PSC subjects spend significantly more time thinking
about themselves during an experiment than do low PSC
subjects. This item was included as an additional check 
on the division of subjects into high and low PSC groups. 
Also included in these short self-report items were 
questions inquiring as to the subject's ideas about any 
possible hypotheses they might have regarding the 
experiment, any possible strategies they might have used 
during the memory test, how accurate they felt the feedback 
they had received was, and whether anything about the 
experiment or the experimenter had made them suspicious 
(Appendix, p. 101). After a subject had completed these 
items, the experimenter collected the forms and debriefed 
the subject (Appendix, pp. 103, 1 0 ) .
Because of the potentially sensitive nature of the.subject 
matter under study, all participants were carefully 
debriefed. This debriefing included the assurance that 
the subject's high or low accuracy prediction score had 
been manipulated and was not the result of subject's actual 
performance. Subjects then were asked not to divulge 
any information about the experiment to others and were 
given experimental credit for their participation.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS 
Major Analyses
A 2 x 3 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) was performed analyzing change from first accuracy 
prediction rating to second accuracy prediction rating as 
a function of type of feedback (success/failure), source 
of feedback (own/reference group/combined), and level of 
private self-consciousness (high PSC/low PSC), and sex of 
subject (male/female). The summary of this analysis is 
presented in Table 1 and the relevant mean scores are presented 
in Table 2. The major results in a significant four-way 
interaction (success/failure by own/reference group/combined 
by high/low PSC by first/.second accuracy prediction rating 
(F (1, 72) = 3.229, £ .05). When given feedback that was
ostensibly their own, subjects elevated their second accuracy 
prediction in response to success feedback and lowered their 
second accuracy prediction in response to failure feedback.
This pattern was also present in the combined feedback condi­
tion. The opposite pattern, however, was present in the 
reference group feedback condition. Subjects in the reference 
group success feedback condition lowered their second accuracy 
prediction ratings to a level significantly lower than 
in both the own and combined groups feedback conditions.
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY TABLE
SPURGES OF V A R IA NCE §U M _ O F _ S g U A R E S  M E A H S g U A R E  F
A 2 2 5 . 3 3 3 2 2 5 . 3 3 3 1.019 0 . 317
8 8 2 9 . 5 7 3 414 . 78 6 1. 876 0 . 158
AB 7 6 0 3 . 3 2 3801 . 6 6 17 . 1 9 6 0 . 0 0 0 * * *
C 12224 .1 12224.1 5 5 . 2 9 3 0 . 0 0 0 * * *
AC 2 4 . 0 8 3 2 2 4 . 0 8 3 2 0 . 1 0 9 0 . 741
BC 3 2 6 . 4 4 8 163 . 224 0 . 7 3 8 0 . 5 1 4
ABC 5 3 . 9 4 7 8 2 6 . 9 7 3 9 0 . 1 2 2 0 . 8 8 5
0 2 5 6 . 6 8 8 2 5 6 . 6 8 8 1.161 0 . 2 8 4
AD 2 . 5 2 0 8 3 2 . 5 2 0 8 3 0 . 01  1 0 . 91  1
BD 2 1 3 . 2 1 9 1 0 6 . 60 9 0 . 4 8 2 0 . 6 2 5
ABD 1701 . 14 8 5 0 . 5 6 8 3 . 8 4 7 0 . 0 2 5 *
CD 3 1 . 6 8 7 4 3 1 . 6 8 7 4 0 . 1 4 3 0 . 7 0 7
A C D 4 0 2 . 52 1 402 . 52 1 1 .821 0 . 1 7 8
BCD 2 2 6 . 3 4 4 1 13 . 172 0 . 5 1 2 0 . 6 0 7
ABCD 9 3 . 011 1 4 6 . 5 0 5 6 0 . 2 1 0 0 . 8 1 2
J 2 7 0 . 7 5 0 2 7 0 . 7 5 0 1 .991 0 . 1 5 9
AJ 8 0 0 . 3 3 3 8 0 0 . 3 3 3 5 . 88 4 0 . 0 1 6 *
BJ 191 .656, 95 . 8281 0 . 7 0 5 0 . 5 0 2
AB J 8 8 2 6 . 4 5 4 4 1 3 . 2 2 3 2 . 4 4 8 0 . 0 0 0 * * *
CJ 9 0 . 7 5 0 0 9 0 . 7 5 0 0 0 . 6 6 7 0 . 5 7 7
ACJ 1 2 0 . 3 3 3 1 2 0 . 3 3 3 0 . 8 8 5 0 . 6 4 7
BCJ 227 . 281 113.641 0 . 8 3 6 0 . 5 5 8
ABC J 8 7 8 . 3 2 3 439 . 16 1 3 . 2 2 9 0 . 0 4 4 *
DJ 1 3 6 . 6 8 8 1 3 6 . 68 8 1 . 005 0 . 3 2 0
ADJ 1.68751 1.68751 0 . 0 1 2 0 . 9 0 7
BDJ 9 0 . 0 9 3 7 4 5 . 0 4 6 9 0 . 331 0 . 7 2 4
ABD J 3 6 . 9 6 8 7 1 8 . 4 8 4 3 0 . 1  36 0 . 8 7 3
CDJ 3 1 . 6 8 7 4 3 1 . 6 8 7 4 0 . 2 3 3 0 . 6 3 6
ACDJ 17.5211 17.521 1 0 . 1 2 9 0 . 721
BCDJ 2 4 3 . 2 1 9 1 2 1 . 60 9 0 . 8 9 4 0 . 5 8 3
ABCD J 1 0 0 . 5 1 0 5 0 . 25 5 0 0 . 3 6 9 0 . 6 9 7
*  = . 05 
* *  = . 01 
* * *  = .001
TABLE 2
MEAN ACCURACY PREDICTIONS AS A FUNCTION OF 
TYPE OF FEEDBACK, SOURCE OF FEEDBACK, AND 
LEVEL OF PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
Source of Feedback 
Type of Feedback Own Reference Combined
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Success Feedback
High PSC 69.4 79.4 62.5 53.8 63.1 81.9
Low PSC 44.4 71.9 52.5 35.0 48.8 57.5
Failure Feedback
High PSC 70.0 61.3 a 64.6 cd00•00r~ 68.8 49.8
Low PSC 52.5 43.8 51.3 71.3 45.0 37.5
NOTE: Second accuracy prediction rating means with common
subscripts do not differ at the .05 level.
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In the failure feedback conditions both subjects in the ovfrn 
and combined feedback conditions lowered their second accuracy 
prediction ratings in response to failure feedback that was 
ostensibly their own and others, respectively. In the refer­
ence group condition subjects raised their second accuracy 
prediction ratings after being given failure feedback from 
a reference group. Both the lowered means in the reference 
group/success condition and the raised means in the reference/ 
group failure condition were signficantly different from the 
means in the other conditions with the exception of the means 
of the high PSC subjects in the own/failure condition and 
the reference group/failure condition (Newman-Keuls post-hoc 
test, £ .05).
Initial Accuracy Prediction Ratings
A main effect for level of private self-consciousness 
emerged (f (1, 72) = 55.293, £ .001). A one-tailed
_t-test was performed comparing the means of the high and 
low PSC subjects to determine if significant differences 
existed in the magnitude of their initial accuracy prediction 
ratings. The difference between the means was statistically 
significant (_t = 7.28, df = 94, £ = .001). The mean initial
accuracy prediction rating in the High PSC group (66.2) was 
higher than the mean accuracy prediction rating in the low 
PSC group (49.1). A significant difference also existed 
between the means of the second accuracy prediction ratings 
for high and low PSC subject (t - 6.13, df = 94, £ .001).
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The mean second accuracy prediction rating in the high PSC 
group (67.4) was higher than the mean second accuracy pre­
diction rating in the low PSC group (52.8).
Memory Test Results
To test the prediction that high PSC subjects would 
perform more in accordance with their predicted behavior 
on the memory test than would low PSC subjects a proportion 
was constructed for each subject composed of the number 
of words missed in the expected categories over the total 
number of words missed on the memory test. The mean 
proportion for high PSC subjects (.377) was almost identical 
to the mean proportion for low PSC subjects (.350). The 
determined proportions of high and low PSC subjects were 
also examined by dividing the total distribution of proportions 
into quartiles. An examination of the number of subjects 
in each guartile revealed approximately equal numbers of 
high and low subjects, in each quartile. High PSC subjects 
were not represented more in upper quartile cells than were 
low PSC subjects. The number of high PSC subjects in the 
third and fourth quartiles (22) was identical to the number 
of low PSC subjects (22).
Variation of Accuracy Predictions
The total variation displayed by high and low PSC sub­
jects from first to second accuracy prediction ratings was 
examined. The overall variance of high PSC subjects (5253.33) 
and low PSC subjects (5358.33) was very similar. However,
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upon examination of the variation displayed by high and 
low PSC subjects within each source of feedback condition 
it was revealed that high PSC subjects (2382.22) exhibited 
more variation in response to their own feedback than did 
low PSC subjects (1503.33) (F (15, 15) = 1.50, ns.). In 
the reference group feedback condition low PSC subjects 
(2250.00) exhibited more variation in response to feedback 
ostensibly from a reference group than did high PSC subjects 
(1714.70) (F (15, 15) = 1.29, ns.). In the combined feedback 
condition, low PSC subjects (1599.97) exhibited more variation 
than did high PSC subjects (1128.44) (F (15, 15) = 1.42, 
ns.) in response to feedback that was ostensibly their own 
and a reference groups'.
Source of Feedback Trends
As mentioned initially, a significant four-way inter­
action (success/failure by own/reference group/combined 
by high low PSC by first/second accuracy prediction rating 
emerged. Although both the initial and the second accuracy 
prediction ratings were found to be significantly higher 
for high PSC subjects than for low PSC subjects, no essential 
difference was displayed among subjects within both type 
of feedback and source of feedback, conditions for the first 
accuracy prediction rating, with the exception of a slight 
reversal of the success and failure predictions in the com­
bined feedback condition. But upon examination of the second 
accuracy prediction ratings, a definite reversal pattern
was observed. The means of the groups given success feedback 
were higher than the means of the groups given failure feed­
back in both the own and combined feedback conditions, but 
in the reference group condition subjects given failure 
feedback reported means higher than the means reported by 
subjects given success feedback (Figures 1 and 2).
Attentional Focus Measure
A least squares regression analysis was performed 
regressing direction of attentional focus (inward or outward 
during the course of the experiment on a scale of -4 to 
0 and 0 to 4, respectively) on level of private self- 
consciousness. Results indicated a significant relationship 
(F (1, 94) = 5.33, £ < .05), although the percentage of 
variance accounted for was small (5.4%). The direction 
of attentional focus was constant; that is, the majority 
(30) of high PSC subjects reported focusing inward during 
the course of the experiment and the majority (30) of low 
PSC subjects reported focusing outward during the course 
of the experiment. However, within each direction of focus 
the magnitude of variation exhibited was large enough that 
the amount of variance in direction of attentional focus 
attributable to level of private self-consciousness is 
modest.
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Sex Differences
A significant three-way interaction (success/failure 
by o wn/referenee group/combined by female/male averaged 
over first and second accuracy pr ediction ratings) also 
emerged (£ (1 , 72) = 3.847, j). .05). The averaged first
and second accuracy prediction ratings for females presented  
an almost mirror-image pattern with respect to the averaged 
prediction ratings for males. Females in the own and 
combined feedback co nditions receiving success feedback 
had higher average predictions than males in the own and 
combined feedback co nditions receiving success feedback, 
whereas, in the reference group feedback condition, 
females receiving success feedback had lower average 
predi ctions than did males in the same condition. Males 
in all three conditions receiving success feedback exhibited 
nearly identical averaged accuracy prediction ratings. 
Conversely, females in all three conditions receiving 
failure feedback exhibited nearly identical averaged accuracy 
prediction ratings, whereas males in the own and combined 
feedback conditions receiving failure feedback displayed 
a decrement in averaged prediction ratings in these two 
source of feedback conditions and an increase in the
reference group failure feedback condition (Figure 3).
Females seemed to be more inspired by their own success
and their own success when reported with others' success.
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Females who received information co ncerning o t h e r s ’ 
failure, however, were less affected by this success than 
were males. Males did not seem to be differentially 
affected by reports of successful performance which was 
ostensibly their own, o t h e r s ’ , or their own and others'. 
Females^ xn a ix three feedback conditions, displayed the 
same degree of response, whereas, males receiving failure 
performance feedback were more affected by this information 
when the source of feedback was their own and their own and 
others'. When males received failure feedback information 
ostensibly from a reference group, their averaged accuracy 
prediction ratings were higher than those of females in the 
same condition. It could be tentatively concluded that 
females were more encouraged by successful feedback when 
it involved theselves, but not when it involved others ' 
performance. Males seemed to be less encouraged when the 
failure feedback given was their own and their own and 
o t h e r s ’ and more en couraged when a refe rence group failure 
performance was reported.
Figure Caption
Figure 1 . Mean initial accuracy prediction ratings 
a function of type of feedback, source of feedback, 
and level of private self-consciousness.
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Figure Caption
Figure 2 . Mean second accuracy prediction ratings as 
a function of type of feedback, source of feedback, 
and level of private self-consciousness.
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Figure Caption
Figure 3 . Averaged first and second accuracy prediction 
ratings as a funct ion of type of feedback, source of 
feedback and sex of subject.
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CHAPTER V
Discussion
A number of interesting effects emerged in the present 
study, with either partial or complete support being found 
for four of the five predictions put forth. Support was 
demonstrated for the hypothesis that high PSC subjects would 
report higher initial accuracy prediction ratings than low 
PSC subjects (£ c.001), with accuracy prediction ratings
measuring the degree of expected correspondence between 
categories in which forgetfulness was predicted to occur 
and categories in which forgetfulness actually occurred 
on the memory test. The initial accuracy prediction ratings 
of high PSC subjects were from 10 to 25 percentage points 
higher in every cell than were the ratings reported by low 
PSC subjects.
Although high PSC subjects reported a higher level 
of expected correspondence between their predicted memory 
behavior and their actual memory behavior, no support was 
found for the prediction that the memory test results of 
high PSC subjects would more closely approximate the categories 
in which forgetfulness was predicted to occur than would 
the memory test results of low PSC subjects. An examination 
of the mean proportion of words missed in the expected 
categories over the total number of words missed on the
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memory test revealed almost identical proportions for high 
PSC subjects (.377) and low PSC subjects (.350). Additionally, 
no support was found for the prediction that high PSC subjects 
would be represented more in the upper quartiles of the 
distribution of these proportions than would low PSC 
subjects. The number of high and low PSC subjects in the 
third and fourth quartiles was identical (22).
The prediction that high PSC subjects would be less 
suggestible, that is, they would conform less to the feedback 
standard given, whether success or failure, was only minimally 
supported. Due to the existence of virtually no conformity 
to the success or failure feedback standard in the reference 
group condition, conformity by high and low PSC subjects 
was examined for the own and combined feedback conditions. 
Degree of conformity was measured by the number of percentage 
points raised or lowered in the direction of the feedback 
standard (92.3% for success feedback and 26.3% for failure 
feedback). Contrary to prediction, when given success feed­
back that was ostensibly their own, high PSC subjects (+10%) 
conformed less to the feedback standard (+10%) than did 
low PSC subjects (+27%). When given failure feedback that 
was ostensibly their own, both high and low PSC subjects 
conformed to the feedback standard by the same number of 
percentage points (-9%).
A greater matching to standard was predicted for both 
high and low PSC subjects in the combined feedback condition 
due to the combined knowledge that both their own performance
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and the performance of a peer reference group was in the 
same percentage range (both success or both failure). However, 
high PSC subjects (+18%) in the combined feedback condition 
conformed more to the success feedback standard than did 
low PSC subjects (+9%), and when given a^failure feedback 
standard, high PSC subjects (-19%) also conformed more than 
did low PSC subjects (-8%). When the degree of conformity 
was compared in the own and combined feedback conditions 
for both levels of PSC subjects it was revealed that high 
PSC subjects in the success/combined condition conformed 
more than did high PSC subjects in the success/own condition. 
Low PSC subjects in the success/combined condition, however, 
conformed less than did low PSC subjects in the success/own 
condition. When a failure feedback standard was given, 
high PSC subjects conformed more in the failure/combined 
condition than did high PSC subjects in the failure/own 
condition, whereas low PSC subjects in the failure/combined 
condition conformed by approximately the same number of 
percentage points as did low PSC subjects in the failure/own 
condition. Therefore, more matching to the feedback standard 
was exhibited by high PSC subjects in the combined feedback 
conditions, but not by low PSC subjects.
Upon examination of the total variation displayed by 
high and low PSC subjects from first to second accuracy 
prediction ratings, no support was found for the prediction 
that high PSC subjects would exhibit less variability than 
would low PSC subjects. The overall amount of variability
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shown by high PSC subjects was very similar to the amount 
of variability shown by low PSC subjects. However, partial 
support was demonstrated for the prediction that more vari­
ation would occur among high PSC subjects when the source 
of their feedback was their own performance. Although the 
variance ratio was not significant (£ > .05), high PSC 
subjects displayed more variability in response to feedback 
about what was ostensibly their own performance than did 
low PSC subjects. In the reference group feedback condition, 
as predicted, low PSC subjects displayed more variability 
in response to feedback ostensibly from a peer reference 
group than did high PSC subjects. Although the variance 
ratio (£ > .05) is not significant here either, the magnitude 
of the variation is in the predicted direction. Low PSC 
subjects also exhibited more variation in the combined feed­
back condition than did high PSC subjects, although the 
variance ratio (£ > .05) failed to reach the level of 
significance,
As indicated by the significant four-way interaction, 
support was demonstrated for the prediction concerning 
different trends in the own feedback condition and the ref­
erence group feedback condition. The means of both high 
and low PSC subjects given success feedback were higher 
than the means of both high and low PSC subjects given failure 
feedback in the own feedback condition, but in the reference 
group condition, both high and low PSC subjects given failure 
feedback reported means higher than the means reported by
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subjects given success feedback.
Support was also demonstrated for the prediction that 
high PSC subjects would report spending more time focusing 
inward during the course of the study than low PSC subjects 
(£ < .05). Although the percentage of variance accounted 
for was small, the direction of attentional focus was 
constant.
Implications for Previous Research
Previous research has produced evidence that situationally- 
induced self-awareness motivates an individual to bring 
disparities between one's actions and statements about those 
actions into alignment (Carver, 1975), to be consistent 
in the self-reporting of an earlier decision (Pryor et al., 
1977), and to perform aggressive behaviors that are more 
consistent with one's values about aggression than subjects 
who were not self-focused. Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 
(1975) suggested that the disposition to focus inward would 
influence behavior in the same manner as situationally induced 
self-awareness. Scheier (1976) found high PSC individuals 
to be more aware of their anger, and, subsequently, more 
aggressive when angry than low PSC individuals. Additionally, 
Scheier et al. (1978) demonstrated that subjects high in 
PSC were more aware of their sympathy toward a handicapped 
person than subjects low in PSC. Evidence was also provided 
by Turner (1976) that high PSC subjects were more accurate 
and more detailed in their self-reports.
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In the present study, individual differences in the 
trait of private self-consciousness were expected to influence 
the behavior of high PSC subjects in a manner consistent 
with the findings of situationally-induced self-awareness 
(more accurate self-reports). The memory test results of 
high PSC subjects were predicted to more closely approximate 
the predicted categories in which forgetfulness was expected 
to occur than would the memory test results of low PSC 
subjects. However, the results of the present study do 
not provide support for the increased accuracy of self-reports 
among high PSC subjects. The proportion of words missed 
which had been predicted did not differ depending upon whether 
the subject was high or low in private self-consciousness.
The number of words missed on the memory test that had been 
predicted by the subject as being difficult to remember 
was small for both high and low PSC subjects.
Previous research concerned with the effects of 
situationally-heightened self-focus on suggestibility and 
conformity has produced contradictory findings. Heightened 
self-focus has been shown to lead a person to be less resistant 
to the influence of others and more likely to conform (Carver, 
1974; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). Other research (Scheier,
Carver, & Gibbons, 1979) has shown that situationally- 
heightened self-focus can increase a person's cognizance 
of one's internal state and make that person more resistant 
to the suggestions and influences of others. The self-aspect 
toward which the influence attempt was directed was suggested
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by Scheier et al. (1979) to influence the degree of conformity 
exhibited. Some self-aspects, like bodily states, may require 
little social validation, and it may be for only those self- 
aspects that self-focused attention will increase resistance 
to suggestion. The self-aspect of memory behavior was chosen 
in the present study since it represented a self-aspect 
that is internally based, but, additionally, a self-aspect 
that can have socially advantageous or socially adverse 
consequences. The criteria for the validation of the self­
aspect of memory behavior should be ambiguous in this case 
and should not influence conformity behavior to the extent 
that distinctly internal or distinctly external self-aspects 
have influenced conformity behavior in previous research.
In the present study, the effects of individual 
differences in the trait of private self-consciousness were 
examined to determine if the disposition to focus inward 
would influence conformity behavior in a manner consistent 
with the effects of situationally-heightened self-focus.
One factor hypothesized to influence conformity behavior 
in the present study was the greater salience of information 
concerning the self for high PSC subjects than for low PSC 
subjects. Although previous research (Diener & Scrull,
1979) provided evidence that high PSC subjects rewarded 
themselves more when they had surpassed a social standard 
than when they had surpassed their own standard, other 
research (Cheek & Briggs, 1982) found that high PSC 
individuals rated their personal identities to be more
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important than did their less self-conscious counterparts.
In the present experiment, it was reasoned that individuals 
who report spending more time focusing inward on their 
thoughts, feelings, and motives would be more interested 
in information concerning themselves than in information 
concerning others. This heightened importance of self­
information for high PSC subjects was predicted to have 
two consequences in the present study. High PSC subjects 
were expected to conform more to the feedback standard given 
when it was information about what was ostensibly their 
own performance (whether success or failure) and, secondly, 
to exhibit more variability in their accuracy prediction 
ratings than low PSC subjects. Although the second accuracy 
prediction ratings of high PSC subjects were closer to the 
feedback standard given in the success condition, in terms 
of total number of percentage points raised toward the stand­
ard high PSC subjects would be said to have conformed less 
than low PSC subjects when the source of the feedback was 
information about their own performance. In the failure 
feedback condition, both high and low PSC subjects conformed 
to the feedback standard by the same number of percentage 
points; however, the second accuracy prediction ratings 
of low PSC subjects were closer to the feedback standard 
than were the ratings of high PSC subjects. It appears 
that information concerning one's own performance did not 
have the predicted influence upon high PSC subjects in the 
present study.
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The second consequence of the importance of self- 
information was predicted to be increased variability for 
high PSC subjects in the own feedback condition. Self- 
information, by virtue of its1 greater salience for high 
PSC subjects, was predicted to complicate the matching-to- 
standard process for these subjects. The result of this 
complication was predicted to be both greater overestimation 
and greater underestimation of ability to correctly predict 
memory behavior for high PSC subjects. Weak support was 
found for this prediction; although the variance ratio was 
not significant, the magnitude of the variances for high 
and low PSC subjects were in the prediction direction.
In the reference group feedback condition, information 
concerning others was predicted to complicate the matching- 
to-standard process more for low PSC subjects than for high 
PSC subjects. Presumably, information concerning others' 
performance would be of less importance for those who 
habitually reported focusing inward. Directional support 
was also found for this prediction; although, again, the 
variance ratio was not significant, the magnitude of the 
variance for high and low PSC subjects were in the predicted 
direction.
The present study also provides support for the existence 
of different trends resulting from feedback thought to be 
one's own and feedback thought to represent the performance 
of a peer reference group. Feather (1966) demonstrated 
that success feedback leads to elevated expectancies for
future performance and more successful future performance 
when the feedback was reported to be the subject's own 
performance score. When failure feedback was given that 
was ostensibly the subject's own, lowered expectancies for 
future performance and less successful future performance 
resulted. However, previous research by Weiner (1972) 
reported a different trend when the feedback was that of 
a peer reference group. When told that a reference group 
had performed very successfully on a task, subjects lowered 
their own subsequent expectancies, thus, providing themselves 
with a face-saving excuse in case their behaviors failed 
to match those of the reference group. When told that a 
reference group had performed at a level which the subjects 
would perceive as a failure experience, the tendency was 
for the subjects to raise their own subsequent expectations, 
assuming themselves to be better than the average person. 
Support for the occurrence of these different trends was 
strongly demonstrated in the present experiment. In the 
own and the combined feedback conditions, the means of groups 
given success feedback were higher than the means of the 
groups given failure feedback. However, in the reference 
group condition, subjects given failure feedback reported 
means higher than the means reported by subjects given 
success feedback.
Previous research by Fenigstein (1979) measured 
measured subjects’ direction of attentional focus on a 
9-point scale during the course of his research and provided
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evidence that level of private self-consciousness might 
be a consistent determinant of direction of attentional 
focus. The majority of subjects designated as high in PSC 
in the present study also reported focusing inward during 
the course of the experiment. Also, the majority of subjects 
designated as low in PSC reported focusing outward during 
the course of the present study. Although the direction 
of attentional focus was constant for high and low PSC sub­
jects (inward and outward, respectively), no firm conclusion 
can be drawn on the basis of the present evidence since 
the percentage of variance accounted for by level of private 
self-consciousness was small.
Additional Related Research Findings
Research findings, both dated and recent, which did 
not come to the experimenter's attention until after the 
initiation of the present Study, offer either additional 
or alternative explanations for several of the results.
A phenomena termed "illusion of control" emerged in a study 
by Langer (1975) investigating factors involved in skill 
situations which when introduced into chance situations 
caused individuals to feel inappropriately confident. Langer 
defined "illusion of control" as an expectancy of a personal 
success probability inappropriately higher than the objective 
probability would warrant. Several of the factors hypothe­
sized to produce the "illusion of control" in a skill situation 
were evident in the present study (competition, choice,
familiarity, and involvement). Subjects were told the study 
was investigating how accurately people predicted their 
memory behavior (implicit competition), subjects chose 
categories of words which they had difficulty remembering 
and made initial accuracy prediction ratings on a scale 
of 0%-100% (choice), subjects knew what material would be 
on the memory test and were instructed as to how to proceed 
in taking the test (familiarity), and subjects actively 
chose categories, took the memory test, maade accuracy pre­
dictions and answered a self-report item (involvement). 
Although the presence of these skill situation factors pre­
sumably would have produced higher expectancies for personal 
success probabilities for all subjects, only high PSC subjects 
reported higher initial accuracy prediction ratings. In 
the present study, the reasoning behind the higher initial 
accuracy prediction ratings for high PSC subjects was that 
these subjects possessed both more self-information and 
more accurate self-information (Turner, 1976) and would 
be, therefore, more confident of a correspondence between 
their predicted memory behavior and their actual memory 
behavior. However, no difference was found in the degree 
of correspondence between predicted behavior and actual 
behavior for high PSC and low PSC subjects. An alternative 
explanation may be offered by the "illusion of control" 
phenomena.
The importance of control has been widely discussed 
by both therapists and researchers in the social sciences.
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White (1959) saw this motivation to control one's environment 
as a need for competence, Hendrick (1943) as an instinct 
to master, Adler (1930) as a striving for superiority, and 
deCharms (1968) as a striving for personal causation. Most 
social scientists agree there is a motivation to master 
one's environment, and a complete mastery might include 
the ability to "beat the odds" or to control chance events. 
Langer (1975) also suggested the alternative explanation 
that there is motivation to avoid the negative consequences 
that accompany the perception of having no control. Perhaps 
the disposition to focus inward, private self-consciousness, 
is intricately intertwined with the "will to master" or, 
alternatively, with the need for the perception of control 
in order to avoid the anxiety of temporary loss of control.
The "illusion of control" phenomena could offer an 
alternative explanation for the higher initial accuracy 
prediction ratings of high PSC subjects in the present study. 
Although high PSC subjects reported substantially higher 
initial accuracy prediction ratings than did low PSC subjects, 
the initial accuracy prediction ratings did not differ with 
respect to females and males. Previous research has shown 
that women generally have lower expectations of success 
than do men (Lenney, 1977). Additionally, Alagna (1982) 
measured expectations of success and found that masculine 
and androgynous persons had higher expectations of success 
than did feminine persons. Although no measure was made 
of sex-type in the present study, the finding of no sex
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differences in the elevated initial accuracy prediction 
ratings among high PSC subjects clearly provides evidence 
contrary to the abovementioned research. Presumably, the 
area of memory prediction ability has no prominent, stereo­
typical gender-related expectations (as do other aspects 
of behavior) at least within the limits of the present design.
Females and males did differ, however, in their responses 
to the success and failure feedback standards in the combined 
feedback condition. Females displayed more overall vari­
ability in this condition than did males (p > .05). Females 
also conformed more to the feedback standard when given 
success feedback concerning their own and others' performance. 
Males conformed more to the feedback standard when given 
failure feedback concerning their own and others' performance.
The abovementioned finding can perhaps be explained 
by recent research findings of Franzio and Brewer (1984).
This research studied dispositional self-awareness by 
utilizing experiential sampling methodology (EMS), which 
allows for the random sampling of individuals' thoughts 
and feelings as they go about their normal daily activities. 
Results indicated that low PSC subjects were more likely 
to attend to their private self-aspects if they were pleasant 
than if they were unpleasant, whereas high PSC subjects' 
degree of private self-awareness was unrelated to whether 
the content of this state was pleasant or not. Therefore, 
low PSC subjects were hypothesized to engage in a more 
selective type of self-attention when in the private self-
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aware state than do high PSC subjects. It is certainly 
possible that this type of selective self-attention operates 
on a gender level also and could explain females1 greater 
response to success and males' greater response to failure 
in the present study.
Additional support for the selective type of self­
attention hypothesis is also demonstrated in the present 
study. High PSC subjects responded to the combined feedback 
standard (whether success or failure) more than did low 
PSC subjects. Attention to private self-aspects for high 
PSC subjects was unrelated to its positive or negative 
content.
Limitations of the Present Study
Upon consideration of the finding of no difference 
between high and low PSC subjects in their ability to match 
their predicted behavior to their actual behavior, it must 
be considered that the task in the present study (the memory 
test) did not provide an adequate vehicle for a test of 
the hypothesis that high PSC subjects show more correspondence 
between their stated behavior and their actual behavior. 
Validity may be lacking in the correspondence of the meaning 
of the question asked and the actual task to be performed. 
Remembering "names" per se is a different activity than 
attaching names to faces. "How well are you at remembering 
names?" is a question which will usually be interpreted 
in the second way, but the task is actually the first kind.
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In additional limitation concerning the memory test 
usage in the present study may be that a task such as pre­
dicting memory behavior for categories of words one has 
difficulty remembering is too unrelated to actual daily 
or worldly experiences to show the expected increased pre­
diction accuracy for high PSC subjects. Subjects may not 
"take notice" of memory behavior to the extent that they 
do of other, more pertinent behaviors.
Subjects in the present study might also have experienced 
confusion concerning the exact meaning of the accuracy pre­
diction ratings they were asked to make. Although the 
instructions concerning the accuracy prediction ratings 
were clear, some ambiguity could exist as to whether the 
subject was predicting the accuracy of one's predictions 
of one's own performance or one's predictions of one's 
accuracy of recall on the test itself. A "higher" degree 
of accuracy would mean two different things for the two 
cases.
Finally, more information could have been obtained 
from the present study by the inclusion of an experimental 
condition which would present subjects with combined feedback 
that paired successful subject feedback with unsuccessful 
reference group performance and failure subject feedback 
paired with successful reference group performance. In 
this situation, subjects' conformity toward either of the 
sources of feedback could be examined and a more pure test 
of high and low PSC subjects' responses to the importance
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of their own feedback and the feedback of others' could 
be assessed, perhaps lending or denying support to the find­
ings of the Diener and Scrull study (1979)
Future Research
Individual differences in the trait.of self-consciousness 
produced significant differences between both the initial 
and the second accuracy prediction ratings of high and low 
PSC subjects. The finding that higher accuracy prediction 
ratings persisted for high PSC subjects and lower accuracy 
prediction ratings persisted for low PSC subjects may indicate 
the operation of a mechanism such as "illusion of control" 
(Langer, 1975). A relationship may exist between the need 
or desire to master one's environment and level of private 
self-consciousness. Future research correlating either 
the needs for control or the need to avoid loss of temporary 
control with level of private self-consciousness would be 
productive.
Research investigating the relationship between private 
self-consciousness and public self-consciousness provided 
evidence that the two are only weakly correlated (Fenigstein 
et al., 1975). No measure was made of reports of subjects' 
degree of public self-consciousness in the present study; 
however, this information would be useful in explaining 
low PSC subjects lessened degree of conformity in the 
combined feedback condition.
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Conclusions
The present study hypothesized that the disposition 
or tendency to focus inward (private self-consciousness) 
would influence behavior in the same manner as situationally- 
induced self-awareness in certain respects and disconfirm 
previous research in this area in other respects.
Results indicated that subjects high in PSC did differ 
from low PSC subjects in the magnitude of their initial 
accuracy prediction ratings, but were not more accurate 
in their predictions concerning word categories than were 
subjects low in PSC. Also, contrary to prediction, all 
subjects exhibited approximately the same amount of vari­
ability from first to second accuracy prediction rating.
High PSC subjects did vary more in response to feedback 
that was their own and low PSC subjects did vary more in 
response to feedback from a peer reference group; however, 
the variance ratios failed to reach levels of significance. 
High PSC subjects did not conform more to the feedback stan­
dard given when the source of feedback was ostensibly their 
own than did low PSC subjects. No conformity to the feedback 
standard existed in the reference group conditions, therefore, 
no support was found for the prediction that low PSC subjects 
would conform more to the feedback standard when its' source 
was ostensibly a peer reference group than would high PSC 
subjects. Significant differences were found in the amount 
of time spent focusing inward or outward during the course 
of the experiment by high and low PSC subjects, respectively,
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although the amount of variance accounted for by level of 
private self-consciousness was small.
Information obtained from the analysis of the trends 
of the accuracy prediction ratings also followed the predicted 
directions. In the own and the combined feedback condition 
subjects given success feedback elevated their subsequent 
expectations for future performance and subjects given failure 
feedback lowered their subsequent expectations for future 
performance. In the reference group feedback condition, 
the "face-saving" pattern and the "better than average" 
pattern occurred.
Individual differences in level of private self- 
consciousness presumably had an effect on a number of domains 
which were not measured in the present study. Individuals 
might exhibit different types of personal standards or 
different styles of discrepancy reduction. Even different 
degrees of suspicion regarding the nature of the study might 
have an influence on subjects’ behaviors. The possibility 
also exists that the effects of the disposition to focus 
inward (private self-consciousness) might have been mitigated 
by interaction with the experimenter or the experimental 
setting, thus increasing an individual's social consciousness. 
If this were the case, any differences in behavior thought 
to originate from differences in level of private self- 
consciousness might have been overpowered by social evaluation 
apprehension or experimental demand characteristics.
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Subject: Please indicate on the scale below each
item how much each of the ten statements 
printed below describes or is characteristic 
of you.
1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.
0
Not
Characteristic Characteristic
2. Generally, I ’m not very aware of myself.
0
N o t  • PHChac. Chac
3. I.reflect about myself a lot.
0
*ot Chac.C h a c .
4. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies
0
2*ot ChacC h a c .
5. I never scrutinize myself.
Not 
Chac . Chac .
I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
0
Not
Chac . C h a c ■
I'm constantly examining my motives
0
Not r .
Chac. Chac
I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere 
watching myself.
0
Not
Chac. Chac.
I'm alert to changes in my mood.
0
N o t  P KChac. Chac.
I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work 
through a problem.
0 1 2  3 4
Not 
Chac . Chac .
93INTRODUCTION TO STUDY
This experiment is a continuing study investigating 
the accuracy with which people predict their behavior.
You will be asked to fill out a number of self-report 
forms both before and during the experiment. Please 
remember that there is no right answer to these questions. 
Your answers are as individual as yourself, so please 
answer each question as carefully and as honestly as you 
c a n .
During the experiment you will be asked to take 
several memory tests. You will be given the content of 
the test beforehand and will be asked to choose the material 
you think will be difficulty for you to remember. You will 
then fill out an "accuracy rating" which will be a measure 
of how accurately the material you chose as being difficult 
for you to remember will actually "match" the material you 
forget when you take the memory tests. If you accurately 
select categories which you have difficulty remembering, 
you could be said to have predicted your behavior accurately.
Please follow the instructions on each printed form 
you are given and do not put your name on any of the forms. 
The experimenter will answer any questions you have regarding 
the instructions or procedures for the experiment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MEMORY TEST 94
Listed below are ten categories of nouns. Please 
select three of these ten categories which are categories 
you have difficulty remembering. On the three lines to 
the right of the list write the names of the three 
categories which are difficult for you to remember.
Place the name of the category you think you will have 
most difficulty remembering on the first line. Write 
the category name you think you will have second most 
difficulty with on the second line. Finally, write the 
category name you will have third most difficulty re m e m ­
bering on the third line.
Example: I forget colors most often, dates next
most often, and animals third most often.
Categories Categories You
Have Difficulty Remembering
RELATIVES
NAMES
STATES 1. ___________________
COLORS
VEGETABLES
PROFESSIONS 2. ___________________
MILITARY TITLES 
UNITS OF TIME
DATES 3. ___________________
ANIMALS
* * * Accuracy Prediction Rating
Rate yourself on the scale below as to how accurately 
you think your behavior on the memory test will actually 
match your predictions above. That is, how close a match 
do you think there will be between the categories you 
selected above and the words you actually miss on the 
memory test.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% '  100%
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DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE MEMORY TEST
The experimenter will leave the room to facilitate 
your concentration while taking the memory test. You 
will first hear a list of 40 words spoken. These words 
will be words from each of the 10 categories presented 
earlier. They will be presented in random order. You 
are simply to listen to this first list carefully.
Following this list of words, there will be a short 
pause. You will then hear the words "second list".
After you hear these words you are to listen to the next 
word and determine if it was a word from the first list 
that you had heard before. If you think the word is 
one that you had heard before, place a check mark in the 
column marked YES on the answer sheet. If you determine 
that the word had not been heard before, place a check 
mark in the column marked NO on the answer sheet. You 
are to follow this procedure for each oneof the words 
you will hear on the tape recorder. Be sure to make a 
decision about each word, even if it is a guess. When 
you have completed the memory test, please signal the 
experimenter .
Fall-1985
University of Montana 
McArthur/Dr. Beaman
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Subject Number
ACCURACY SCORE RESULTS
S u b j e c t ’s Accuracy Score 
(Memory Test One)
%
* * * Second Accuracy Prediction Rating - Please rate yourself 
on the scale below as to how accurately you think your 
behavior on a second memory test will match your predicted 
behavior. Remember, you are predicting about the same 
three categories as in the first memory test.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Subject Number
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** * Second Accuracy Prediction Rating - Please rate yourself 
on the scale below as to how accurately you think your 
behavior on a second memory test will match your predicted 
behavior. Reraemer, you are predicting about the same 
three categories as in the first memory test.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Accuracy Prediction Study 
Winter, Spring, Fall - 1985 
Compiled Percentage Results 
McArthur/Dr. Beaman
Overall percentage (accuracy) = 92.5%
over past two quarters
Subject Number ______________
Accuracy score (Memory Test One) =
** * Second Accuracy Prediction Rating _  Please rate yourself 
on the scale below as to how accurately you think your 
behavior on a second memory test will match your predicted 
behavior. Remember, you are predicting about the same 
three categories as in the first memory test.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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Accuracy Prediction Study 
Winter, Spring, Fall - 1985 
Compiled Percentage Results 
McArthur/Dr. Beaman
Overall percentage (accuracy) = 25.5%
over past two quarters
Subject Number _____________
Accuracy score (Memory Test One) =
** * Second Accuracy Prediction Rating - Please rate yourself 
on the scale below as to how accurately you think your 
behavior on a second memory test will match your predicted 
behavior. Remember, you are predicting about the same 
three categories as in the first memory test.
0% 105 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
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ATTENTIONAL FOCUS SCALE
Please indicate the nature of your attentional 
focus while participating in this experiment. Remember, 
there is no "correct" or "normal" answer here. Please 
rate on the 9-point scale below as to whether you 
tended to pay more attention to your inner thoughts, 
feelings, etc. during the experiment or whether your 
attention was directed outward towards the experimental 
situation. Please put an "X" on the scale below to 
indicate the direction of your attentional focus.
3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4
Focused
Inward
Focused
Outward
What do you think the hypothesis of this study was? 
That is,what do you think we were trying to find out?
Did you make any conscious attempt to pay more
attention to words from the three categories you selected?
When we gave you feedback about your performance on 
the memory test, did you feel it was accurate feedback?
Was there anything about this experiment that you did 
not believe or anything the experimenter did that made 
you suspicious about the proceedings?
102
MEMORY TEST WORDS 
First List Second List Oh First List?
1. aunt uncle Yes
2. blue brown No
3. hour year Yes
A . Mary Sue Yes
5. horse bear No
6. New York New Jersey No
7. carrot carrot Yes
8.. doctor nurse No
9. lieutenant captain No
10. 1792 1881 No
11. uncle mother Yes
12. red green Yes
13. minute month No
14. Sue Sally No
15. cow, tiger Yes
16. Florida New York Yes
17. pea tomato No
18. lawyer dentist Yes
19. general lieutenant Yes
20. 1823 1968 No
21. father sister No
22. green white No
23. second minute Yes
24. Anne Mary Yes
25. lion pig No
26. Maryland Vermont Yes
27. corn bean No
28. teacher professor No
29. sergeant major No
30. 1928 1823 Yes
31. mother brother No
32. yellow red Yes
33. year century No
34. Jane Judy No
35. tiger horse Yes
36. Maine Florida Yes
37. bean lettuce No
38. dentist lawyer Yes
39. private private Yes
40. 1953 1928 Yes
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Debriefing
"You are in a social psychology experiment. One 
of the topics we are interested in studying is whether 
or not people can predict what kinds of items they have 
difficulty remembering. So, we asked you to choose 
categories you thought you would have trouble with and 
then had you try to remember words from these categories 
so we could see if you actually did have trouble 
remembering categories you think are tough.
We then gave you untrue success or failure feedback 
(in reference group conditions the feedback about how 
the reference group performed was also false). We wanted 
to see if this feedback would change how you feel about 
the difficulty of remembering words. We d i d n ’t even 
score your performance. We decided randomly, like flipping 
a coin, about,what feedback to give you. We are interested 
in how people respond to thinking they have succeeded or 
f a i l e d .
So, there is no reason for you to think that the 
feedback you received is a reliable indication of how 
well you can predict your behavior. Sometimes in social 
psychology experiments, experimenters have to use a bit 
of deception in order to detract people's attention away 
from what the experimenters are really studying so that 
people will respond naturally.
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Past research in psychology tells us that even 
though subjects are told that their behaviors really 
do not reflect on their abilities, subjects still leave 
the experiment room thinking that they have performed 
well or poorly on the task. You need to know that this 
might happen to you and you should guard against such 
occurrences by consciously reminding yourself that this 
experiment does not measure -or represent any real ability. 
Your results are predetermined and randomly assigned to 
you. Remember that they do not indicate anything about 
your abilities.
Let's look at the last set of questions you filled 
out about the experiment, (go over each of the questions 
with the subject and delicately probe for the nature of 
the suspiciousness, if any, and how it might have influenced 
the subject's performance).
Thank you very much for participating in this 
experiment. If you have any further interest in this 
study, a short explanation of the study and its' results 
will be available at the end of next Fall quarter.
